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Contingency Planning and an Air Force 
Space Command Information System
Future Forecasts
Maj Kaylin Freedman, USAF
Michael R. Grimaila, PhD, AFIT
It is a quiet afternoon.  You are sitting in your office think-ing about how many wings in Air Force Space Command 
(AFSPC) utilize electronic databases to enter and track opera-
tional training, evaluation, and Crew Force Management (CFM) 
data.  This data directly supports the missions of the units by 
meeting regulatory requirements to maintain proficiency and 
qualifications, ensuring only personnel meeting the physical 
requirements perform shifts, determining crew member profi-
ciency for advancement within the unit, and enabling analysis 
of data to improve operations.  No single, common system is in 
use across the command.  The databases in use are not consoli-
dated or standardized and do not interface.  This is not efficient 
and a new system would offer advantages.  
You look out the window and envision the accolades you 
will get if you propose a single, common training, evaluation, 
and CFM information system and wonder what leadership 
could possibly fear about a proposal such as this one.  Suddenly 
the phone rings, the site administrator for your single, common 
information system is on the line wanting to know if you have 
seen the news and would like your opinion on what to do next. 
Every phone line in your office starts ringing.  Your flustered as-
sistant runs in.  You do not know what to do.  You put everyone 
on hold as your assistant explains that a tornado has touched 
down in Colorado Springs.  The building that houses the serv-
ers for your system for the entire command was destroyed.  The 
loss of the system means that eight wings and one group, com-
prising 38 operational units, will have to spend an unspeakable 
number of man-hours to reproduce, to retrain, and possibly re-
evaluate over 3,000 operators.  Even worse, a data loss could 
compromise the weapon systems because without the data the 
units would no longer know who is physically and proficiency 
qualified to perform a shift.  For the three Intercontinental Bal-
listic Missile bases, this means a nuclear surety incident could 
occur which would result in a reduction of alert rate for the 
first time in over 50 years.  As you are thinking about what 
this means for AFSPC and the country, the commander enters 
your office.  You know the commander is looking for answers, 
but you simply stare speechlessly.  Every minute that ticks by 
you know the units are falling behind, nuclear surety is pos-
sibly compromised, and precious manpower is being wasted. 
The commander is furious and tells you to grab a box and start 
packing.  
The phone rings again, and you realize you were daydream-
ing.  There is no crisis, but now you realize that leadership 
might resist your idea of a single, common training, evaluation, 
and CFM information system because of the risk of losing the 
data due to a contingency such as a natural disaster.  So, before 
you start a proposal for AFSPC, you decide to examine what is 
necessary to reduce the risk associated with a critical informa-
tion system and contingencies.  
Overview
Building contingency plans calms fears regarding potential 
losses of information systems which are critical to an organiza-
tion and vital to the operationʼs continued success in a time of 
crisis; the drama demonstrated above provides just some of the 
results of not planning ahead.  For the purposes of this discus-
sion, the focus of the contingency planning is mainly on the 
impact to information systems and not the impact on people. 
Although the impact on people is important, military units are 
required to maintain disaster preparedness plans which already 
focus on what steps leadership and subordinates should take 
during disasters to assist with personnel requirements such as 
first aid, and assembly points.  The term “contingency” refers 
to an event which makes usage of an information system, asset 
or process, not possible for a period of time or permanently.  A 
contingency does not include an event which precludes usage 
of an information system as a result of a security issue such as 
a compromise or malicious attack.   
This article will illustrate that a contingency plan reduces 
risk by examining the impact on civilian organizations and pro-
viding examples from 11 September 2001.  We then examine 
the purpose of risk assessment and a technique for conducting 
risk assessment.  A planner cannot properly design a contin-
gency plan until the risk and potential losses are determined 
because these factors establish the need for a plan.  Finally, we 
provide a guide for constructing a contingency plan.  The plan-
ner must adhere to a guide to build the plan in order to ensure 
that it encompasses what is necessary for survival and to ensure 
the plan is thorough.  This article is not all-inclusive, and it is 
important to note there are a variety of approaches to contin-
gency plans and procedures; the purpose here is to highlight the 
importance of developing and using a contingency plan and to 
provide an insight into the overall process of contingency plan 
construction.  
Why Contingency Plans Are Critical
The role of information and the systems providing the in-
formation in todayʼs society are vital.  The vast majority of 
organizations would not be able to function without informa-
tion, and if information were lost, it could be detrimental to 
operations.  In 2000, Price Waterhouse Coopers reported “that 
90 percent of all companies that experience a computer ʻdi-
saster  ̓ with no pre-existing survival plan go out of business 
within 18 months.”1  The survival rate of organizations without 
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a pre-existing contingency plan seems extremely low, and Price 
Waterhouseʼs data would be suspect if other institutions did not 
report similar results.  However, the Hartford Insurance Com-
pany found that “on average, over 40 percent of businesses that 
do not have a disaster plan go out of business after a major loss 
like a fire, a break-in, or a storm.”2  Gartner Dataquest further 
substantiated the findings by reporting that “two out of five en-
terprises that experience a disaster go out of business within 
five years.”3  Organizations that understand the criticality of 
contingency plans devote the necessary resources to ensure 
they are available when needed.  According to Donna Scott, 
a consultant with Gartner Group, banks expend seven to eight 
percent of their data center budgets on disaster recovery.4  The 
number of organizations predicted to fail due to a contingency 
are astounding, and the amount financial institutions expend on 
contingency plans highlight the importance of having a solid 
plan in place.  
Unfortunately, 11 September 2001 illustrated why contin-
gency plans are critical.  Due to the visibility and the central-
ization of financial institutions in the World Trade Center, their 
destruction and the impact widely increased the impact of the 
desolation.  Many companies could not function for days while 
others were able to return to operations within hours.  Deutsche 
Bank had to evacuate over 5,000 employees, and lost offices 
and all equipment, but were operational within two hours.  A 
bank spokesperson said, “Our plans worked well, our systems 
came back up; we were well prepared.”5  Unfortunately, others 
were not as lucky.  
The most significant and common technology failure was 
the loss of telecommunication.  This factor severely hampered 
disaster recovery for many organizations: “Two major Verizon 
points-of-presence were located in the World Trade Center 
complex, and damage was also sustained by a nearby switching 
unit.”6  Organizations attempting to restore operations and who 
relied on telecommunications for data transfers and customer 
support were severely hampered by the reduction in capabili-
ties.  An additional crippling factor was the lack of redundancy. 
Todd Gordon, vice president and general manger for business 
continuity and recovery services at IBM, said, “There was too 
much concentration of traffic over networks at one Verizon site” 
and added that organizations will “require greater redundancy 
in telecommunications and networking in the future.”7
Another issue that companies experienced was the com-
plete loss of systems and vital information infrastructure.  This 
caused significant and challenging problems: office space had to 
be secured, equipment located, and systems built.  Leslie Hunt, 
chief information officer of the Greater New York chapter of 
the Red Cross, highlighted the importance of having plans in 
place to establish systems for people to use.  Her office had lost 
everything, and had no plan for how to obtain equipment.  Hunt 
was able to secure 12 computers, create local area network and 
wide area network, and proceed to work on making the e-mail 
servers function.8  However, without a plan, the cannibalized 
system was fragile and vulnerable.  The computers and net-
work were not properly configured and, in the end, could not 
handle the workload.  The Greater New York Website crashed 
several times and a virus infected the e-mail server, making the 
systems inoperable for a period of time.9  For the survivors of 
11 September, the Red Cross provided an essential source of 
information, and without the website and e-mail the Red Cross 
was crippled.  Hunt pointed out the need to have plans which 
ensure the systems are in place during a disaster so that people 
can do their jobs “without having to worry about the technol-
ogy they are using.”10
Risk Assessment
When the organization is undergoing a contingency, it is not 
the time to try to determine what information systems are the 
most critical.  In order to avoid this, organizations must conduct 
a risk assessment prior to a contingency plan being composed 
or in concert with the initial steps.  The assessment should entail 
determining the organizationʼs assets and processes, assigning 
a value to the assets and processes, identifying possible contin-
gencies the organization faces, and assembling a detailed report 
which provides recommendations for building the contingency 
plan.  The risk assessment will ensure the need for a contingen-
cy plan is determined before manning is expended on drafting 
one, and a risk assessment will also ensure the focus of the plan 
is on the systems the organization has assessed as critical to the 
organizationʼs operations.  A planner can conduct risk assess-
ment or management in a number of ways.  The methods are 
very similar and serve the same goal of helping the organization 
understand, manage, and reduce the risks encountered in con-
ducting their mission.  The process described here is based on 
the steps highlighted by Michael Erbschloe, author of “Guide 
to Disaster Recovery.”  Figure 1 displays the steps involved:  
One of the first steps of risk assessment is to identify what 
assets the organization possesses and the processes used to con-
duct operations.  This means conducting an inventory of every 
piece of equipment the organization has and documenting the 
processes that the organization accomplishes in order to fulfill 
its mission.  Erbschloe suggests an organization conduct an ex-
posure inventory which lists “all facilities, processes, systems, 
and resources that an organization uses to maintain operations 
and sustain revenue” and includes physical facilities, person-
nel, equipment, installed systems, information technology, of-
fice equipment, and products or parts.11  Once the equipment 
is identified, the organization must be aware of how the inven-
tory is used so that during a contingency the right equipment 
is made available to the right people so the right tasks are ac-
complished to ensure continued operations.  Erbschloe identi-
fies this as the “business processes inventory” and clarifies that 
it must include: “how a process works, the facilities and build-
ings in which the process occurs, the departments that perform 
the process, the personnel who work in the departments, the 
equipment used by the departments, the installed systems on 
Identify assets 
and processes
Rank order 
assets
Identify and 
classify 
contingencies
Build risk 
assessment 
report
Figure 1: Risk Assessment Steps.
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which the departments rely, the information technology that the 
departments have in place, and the parts and supplies that the 
departments need to accomplish their work.”12  
Once planners know what assets are in the organization, they 
need to know which ones require the most protection.  The or-
ganization must carefully rank order its assets.  During a crisis, 
people should not spend valuable time determining what equip-
ment is critical to operations and what should be saved.  Deter-
mining the value of systems in the military can be problematic 
because there is no profit affected and sometimes no identifi-
able customer impacted.  The planner for a military unit needs 
to assess the value of the assets or processes based on support 
to the mission.  Can the mission be accomplished without the 
asset or process?  If not, the value is high and the asset or pro-
cess should earn the highest value of 10.  If the answer is yes, 
the planner must determine at what point the asset or process 
does affect the ability of the unit to perform the mission and 
assign a value based upon this assessment.  According to this 
model, the greater the number of hours between the assets or 
processes inoperability and the resulting impact on the mission 
then the lower the value (determining the spread of the size of 
the value awarded would be contingent to the number of assets 
and processes).  In other words, a system which would impact 
the mission in eight hours if the system is not operable would 
garner a value of eight, whereas a system which would impact 
the mission in 16 hours if the system is not operable would be 
given a five.  
Once the assets and processes at risk are identified and the 
value is known, the planner must list and classify the possible 
contingencies.  Peter G. Neumann, moderator of the online 
ACM Risks Forum, noted that organizations, especially gov-
ernments, build plans to meet the situations of the past instead 
of designing plans to meet the potential new situation.13  One 
way to avoid this trap is for the planner to ensure all contingen-
cies are classified even though the utility may initially seem 
insignificant.  Listing and classifying all possible contingencies 
regardless of the probability will actually improve the process 
by ensuring the organization is prepared for all possibilities and 
not just the known or most recent ones.  
Michael Whitman and Herbert J. Mattord, authors of “Man-
aging Information Security,” provide a method to accomplish 
this task.  The planner should separate natural disasters from 
man-made disasters and list the event followed by the suspect-
ed effect on information systems.14  Erbschloe recommends an-
other process of grouping threats by recurring natural disasters, 
accidents, and “destructive or disruptive deliberate actions” and 
classifying as catastrophic, major, and minor.15  Comprehensive 
Consulting Solutions, however, suggests creating three differ-
ent categories for classification.  Category I represents the least 
serious threats that only last for a few hours, such as a brief 
loss of power.  Category II consists of “localized man-made 
disasters and natural disasters of a more serious nature” with 
effects lasting for days or weeks.  Category III consists of wide-
spread events such as earthquakes or flooding with the potential 
to have an impact for weeks.16
Each of the proposed methods is adequate but when com-
bined they provide a better picture for the planner.  The planner 
should categorize the threats utilizing the numbering system of 
Comprehensive Consulting Solutions, identify the categories 
utilizing Erbschloeʼs categories, and add the suspected effect as 
Whitman and Mattord suggest.  The resulting categories would 
be as follows: Category I, accidents; Category II, minor natural 
or human-made disasters; Category III, major human-made or 
natural disasters; and Category IV, widespread or catastrophic 
events.  Part of identifying and classifying the contingencies is 
determining the likelihood of the event occurring.  The planner 
must research the probability and devise a probability rating to 
be included for each contingency.  The likelihood of a contin-
gency occurring can be determined by contacting local agencies 
and conducting research on, for example, flood plains, weather 
patterns, fault lines, power outages, or grid construction.
Once this research is complete, the planner must tie all of 
this information together.  Erbschole defines this activity as the 
risk assessment report.  This consists of describing the “asset or 
business process that is exposed to risk, the risks themselves, 
and the effectiveness of existing systems designed to mitigate 
these risks.”17  The report is the process of compiling the first 
three steps described and next determining if the organizationʼs 
procedures reduce or eliminate the risks identified.  Initially, 
the planner should focus on developing a risk assessment report 
for the critical assets and processes.  When time permits, the 
planner can return to this step and complete it for those assets 
and processes that are not as critical.  Completing this step and 
moving to developing a contingency plan should not be delayed 
in order to accomplish a risk assessment report on low value 
assets and processes.  
Erbschloe also warns that a risk assessment report may con-
tain proprietary information due to its comprehensive details, 
and organizations should treat the reports as confidential.  The 
planning team will require the reports and leadership may want 
to review them, but minimal dissemination is ideal due to the 
detailed content.
Building a Contingency Plan and Beyond
After the planner has assessed risk, the actual contingency 
plans can be written.  A number of different methodologies for 
writing plans exist and most of them are very similar.  “Man-
agement of Information Security” presents a comprehensive 
and usable contingency plan model.  This model leads the plan-
ner through a logical procession from a minor contingency, to 
a major, to a catastrophic and describes how to construct plans 
to address each type.  What follows is a broad overview of the 
model.
According to “Managing Information Security,” the 
contingency plan consists of three components: the incident 
response plan, the disaster recovery plan, and the business 
continuity plan.  An organization must develop each component 
for each category of contingency identified during the risk 
assessment phase.  This will ensure that personnel are clear on 
the required steps and procedures to take during a contingency. 
As William A. Hussong, Jr., the senior member of the 
professional staff of the special operations division of System 
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Research Applications, Inc., explains, “The plan must basically 
outline peopleʼs responsibilities, the use of equipment and other 
material resources, and detailed operating instructions; nothing 
can be assumed.  The plan is the organizationʼs strategic battle 
plan for recovery… [and the components] …become the 
organizationʼs tactical battle plans for survival.”18
The first, and the largest, component of the contingency plan 
is the Incident Response Plan (IRP).  This is a reactive mea-
sure that “comprises a detailed set of processes and procedures 
that anticipate, detect, and mitigate the effects of an unexpected 
event that might compromise information resources and as-
sets.”19  It is the starting point for all events and includes a set of 
procedures for personnel to follow.  If at all possible, a contin-
gency should be contained and kept at what was defined as the 
minor - Category I or II - level with the goal to address it before 
it becomes a major event.  To accomplish this task, the incident 
response plan must detail the procedures for personnel and the 
organization to take during, after, and before a contingency oc-
curs.  The actions taken are function-specific and are grouped 
and specifically assigned to individuals.20
The IRP is the first component of a contingency plan, and a 
Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) is the second.  This plan is en-
acted when a natural or human-made event occurs in which the 
organization cannot control the impact of an event or the level 
of damage is so severe that the organization cannot quickly re-
covery.21  The DRP plan focuses on preparing for a disaster so 
that restoring operations and recovery is quickly possible.  The 
plan must address all category levels of contingencies identi-
fied during the risk assessment phase.  However, the planner 
must understand that even though the major and catastrophic 
contingencies - Category III and Category IV - have a lower 
probability of occurring, they can have the most overwhelming 
impact to an organization.  
The key points of the DRP are “clear delegation of roles and 
responsibilities,” “execution of the alert roster and notification 
of key personnel,” “clear establishment of priorities,” “docu-
mentation of the disaster,” “inclusion of action steps to mitigate 
the impact of the disaster on the operations of the organiza-
tion,” and “inclusion of alternative implementations for the var-
ious systems components, should primary versions be unavail-
able.”22  The DRP focuses on restoring normal operations to the 
organization as quickly as possible and includes crisis manage-
ment steps.  The crisis management actions are those “that deal 
primarily with the people involved” and comprise of detailing 
public affairs responses, handling emotional issues, and verify-
ing personnel status.23  The disaster recovery plan prepares the 
organization to restore operations when the primary operating 
location is still intact.   
When a contingency is so catastrophic that an organization 
is unable to operate out of its primary location, then the last 
component of the contingency plan, the Business Continuity 
Plan (BCP), must be enacted.  This plan includes the strate-
gies to ensure the company can continue to perform its mission 
and continue to function during a contingency, regardless of 
the magnitude, and is usually managed by the leadership.24  The 
BCP is critical because an organization must continue to per-
form its mission or the organization risks going out of business, 
which for a military organization could impact the security of 
the entire nation or worse.  The key here is developing plans to 
ensure the most mission critical assets or processes are able to 
continue to function or to ensure they can be quickly restored 
regardless of the occurrence of a contingency.  
Restoring assets and processes is possible by taking pre-
contingency actions to protect the information.  Accomplishing 
this serves several purposes such as ensuring that data critical 
to the organizationʼs mission is available, guaranteeing facili-
ties are available, and reducing risk.  The organization should 
conduct pre-contingency actions on those high value assets and 
processes identified in the risk assessment phase.  
As mentioned above, the organizationʼs assets and processes 
were ranked based upon their value to mission performance. 
The planner used this information, budgetary constraints, and 
acceptable risk levels to evaluate which options work best for 
contingency.  Six available options are suggested: hot site, 
warm site, cold site, timeshare, service bureau, and mutual 
agreement.  The first three options are “exclusive-use” (only 
the organization can use the site) and the remaining options are 
shared-use.  “A hot site is a fully configured computer facility, 
[and it has]…all services, communication links, and physical 
plant operations” available.25  Although this option is expen-
sive, it provides instant recovery of data and operations can 
continue almost seamlessly (assuming the hot site is not also 
impacted by the contingency).  The next option is a warm site 
which “provides many of the same services and options as the 
hot site, but typically software applications either are not in-
cluded, or are not installed and configured.”26  Finally, a cold 
site, the least expensive option, consists of “only rudimentary 
services and facilities” and is essentially “an empty room with 
standard heating, air conditioning, and electrical services.”27
Shared-use options, unlike exclusive-use, mean that the or-
ganization shares usage of the facility or services with another 
organization.  The timeshare option can be a hot, warm, or cold 
site, “but it is leased in conjunction with a business partner or 
sister organization.”28  Success is contingent upon the partner 
or sister organizationʼs cooperation and adherence to the time-
share agreement.  A service bureau can be employed and is “a 
service agency that provides a service for a fee” such as data 
storage or floor space.29  The final option is the mutual agree-
ment which “is a contract between two organizations in which 
each party agrees to assist the other in the event of a disaster.”30 
An organization chooses which option is right for them based 
upon what expense it can support, what level of risk it is willing 
to accept, and the timeframe of desired operational recovery. 
All of the options require the ability to access the organiza-
tionʼs data, information systems, and processes in order to oper-
ate.  There are three different methods of storing or protecting 
the data, information systems, and processes.  One of these is 
electronic vaulting: “the bulk batch-transfer of data to an off-
site facility.”31  The organization periodically conducts a batch-
transfer of data to a server at another location.  Except that the 
server is located off site, this is similar to a traditional back up; 
the data is only as current as the latest transfer.  Remote journ-
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aling, another option, transfers “live transactions to an off-site 
facility” so the transaction is current, but it does not transfer 
the archived data.32  The last and most comprehensive option 
is data shadowing which “combines electronic vaulting with 
remote journaling, by writing multiple copies of the database 
simultaneously in two separate locations.”33  Although data 
shadowing is expensive, it is the most thorough, will reduce the 
time required to recover operations, and ensures profit loss and 
mission impact is minimal.  
Once the planner writes the contingency plans, they must 
be tested and updated on a regular basis to ensure currency, 
accuracy, feasibility, and applicability.  Although many organi-
zations affected on 11 September had contingency plans, many 
were not usable.  A consultant at Strohl Systems, a recovery 
software and services firm, explained that “in some cases, the 
plans were too big and ignored detailed issues-where to meet, 
how to contact people, having a disaster hotline that works 
when all phone systems are down.”34  The senior vice president 
of field operations at Comdisco, a contingency services provid-
er added, “We found that [during the events of 11 September] 
our clients were for the most part undersubscribed in terms of 
their need for contingency work areas and networks and termi-
nals…Plans need to be updated every six months.”35  Hussong, 
the senior member from System Research Applications, Inc., 
however recommends rewriting contingency plan procedures 
at least every five years to ensure requirements are kept current, 
new technologies are utilized, and “fresh eyes…look at old so-
lutions to new problems.”36
The actual contingency plan must be available during a con-
tingency.  As one firm discovered during 11 September, the 
only copy of the contingency plan was located in the World 
Trade Center offices, and at another organization, said Strohl 
Systems  ̓Banker, “they had copies of the recovery plan on the 
network in New York and London and Tokyo, but they could 
not get to any of them [due to the lack of telecommunication].”37 
However, there is a difficult balance to maintain between avail-
ability and protecting the organization.  To ensure the plan is 
available accessible, organizations must have multiple copies 
of contingency plans available as hard copies, on different net-
works, and even on multiple hard drives.  However, due to the 
proprietary issues and other classifications issues, the organiza-
tion must be careful not to broadcast the plan to uncontrolled 
locations.  This is an essential point for the planner to keep in 
mind as they disseminate the completed plan to the personnel 
in the organization.  
Option For Air Force Space Command
A single, common training, evaluation, and CFM informa-
tion system for all of AFSPC would be subject to risk from a 
contingency just like any other system.  However, if risk as-
sessment is conducted and a contingency plan is built AFSPCs 
leaders could accept the risk of a contingency occurring.  
One way to immediately reduce the risk of a contingency is 
to wisely choose the location of the database server based upon 
what was learned about contingency plan building.  Utilizing 
the Air Forceʼs Global Combat Support System (GCSS) is one 
way to apply this knowledge.  According to the Warfighting In-
tegration and Chief Information Officer, Knowledge Informa-
tion Management Branch at Headquarters Air Force, the GCSS 
provides a central enterprise server bus to house data that per-
mits authorized users access via remote sign on; it is a set of en-
terprise information services and is protected by multiple layers 
of security.38  Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is 
responsible for parts of GCSS.  DISA hosts GCSS on a server 
farm located in Alabama with data shadowing occurring with a 
server farm at Wright Patterson AFB in Dayton, Ohio.  There 
is a third server farm proposed for San Antonio, Texas which 
will have the same data shadowing service.  Data and trans-
actions will therefore be stored in three different geographical 
locations, significantly reducing risks.  AFSPC users would ac-
cess the single, common information system via remote sign on 
through the Air Force Portal Graphic User Interface.  
Housing the database on the GCSS is only one way to reduce 
the risks associated with this system and will increase lead-
ership support.  A full risk assessment and contingency plan 
would need to be accomplished in order to further mitigate the 
risk to an acceptable level. 
 
Conclusion
Without contingency plans, organizations risk not being able 
to survive or experience mission failure.  Contingency plans 
help an organization to determine what risks they are willing 
to accept and what risks are unacceptable, providing the op-
portunity to take actions to mitigate unacceptable risks.  Using 
examples of what organizations experienced during 11 Septem-
ber, we have illustrated why a contingency plan is critical.  As 
highlighted, the loss of capabilities for organizations without 
a plan or those with untested plans is devastating.  Before a 
contingency plan can be initiated, a risk assessment must be 
accomplished as it identifies the assets and procedures that are 
important to the organization, attempts to determine types and 
chances of a contingency occurring, and assigns a value level 
to the asset or process so the organization knows where to fo-
cus its efforts.  Only after this has occurred can a contingency 
plan be built.  A number of different approaches exist to build 
a contingency plan.  The blueprint presented here is a logical 
and thorough method.  An incident response plan is designed 
to establish procedures to deal with the event immediately.  A 
disaster response plan is the next step.  This will ensure there 
are procedures available if the contingency cannot be contained 
with the incident response plan.  The last plan to be designed 
is the business continuity plan which ensures the organization 
can restore operations if the contingency renders the primary 
site unusable.  With the contingency plan, comprised of these 
components, an organization is prepared to successfully face 
almost any risk.
Armed with this information, an organization will be able 
to face a contingency and survive.  Now you can stop staring 
out the window and begin to effectively address some of lead-
erships  ̓ possible concerns regarding the implementation of a 
single, common training, evaluation, and CFM information 
system and finally make the dream a reality.  Each of us has a 
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zation.  Can your organization survive a disaster?
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